Breadth vs. Depth: The Timing of Specialization in Higher Education by Ofer Malamud
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
BREADTH VS. DEPTH:








I wish to thank Claudia Goldin, Caroline Hoxby, and Larry Katz for extensive comments, as well as
Nittai Bergman, Saar Golde, Jeff Grogger, Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran, Bob Lalonde, Steve
Machin, Klaus Miescke, Derek Neal, Steve Pischke, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Sarah Reber, Bruce Sacerdote,
Anna Vignoles, Abigail Waggoner, Tara Watson and seminar participants at Clemson University,
Hebrew University, Harvard University, Michigan State University, Tel-Aviv University, UCSD, UC
Riverside, University of Chicago, and the NBER Higher Education meeting for many helpful suggestions.
I am grateful to the Universities Statistical Record, the UK Data Archive, and several university administrators
in Scotland and England for assistance. All errors are my own. This work was supported by a grant
from the Spencer Foundation. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Ofer Malamud. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Breadth vs. Depth: The Timing of Specialization in Higher Education
Ofer Malamud




This paper examines the tradeoff between early and late specialization in the context of higher education.
While some educational systems require students to specialize early by choosing a major field of study
prior to entering university, others allow students to postpone this choice. I develop a model in which
individuals, by taking courses in different fields of study, accumulate field-specific skills and receive
noisy signals of match quality in these fields. With later specialization, students have more time to
learn about match quality in each field but less time to acquire specific skills once a field is chosen.
I derive comparative static predictions between educational regimes with early and late specialization,
and examine these predictions across British systems of higher education. Using survey data on 1980
university graduates, I find strong evidence in support of the prediction that individuals who switch
to unrelated occupations initially earn lower wages but less evidence that the cost of switching differs
between England and Scotland. Although more switching occurs in England where students specialize
early, higher wage growth among those who switch eliminates the wage difference after several years.
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Division of labor ￿the tendency of individuals to specialize in speci￿c occupations ￿is an important
feature of the modern labor market. However, for many professional occupations, such as those
held by scientists, engineers, managers, lawyers, and teachers, specialization begins prior to labor
market entry when an individual chooses a ￿eld of study in university.1 The timing of such academic
specialization varies across di⁄erent systems of higher education. In some systems, students are
required to choose a ￿eld of study before they apply to college. In others, students may postpone
the decision until late in their college careers. These di⁄erences highlight the trade-o⁄ between
accumulating more human capital in a particular ￿eld by specializing early versus gathering addi-
tional information about alternative ￿elds by specializing later. I explore the consequences of early
and late specialization by comparing labor market outcomes across two educational systems with
di⁄erent exogenous constraints on the timing of academic specialization.2
I introduce a simple model to characterize the timing of specialization across di⁄erent systems
of higher education. I assume that individuals initially take courses in a number of di⁄erent ￿elds
of study but must specialize at some point by choosing one ￿eld and taking their remaining courses
in this ￿eld exclusively. A key aspect of the model is that individuals learn about their unobserved
match quality in di⁄erent ￿elds by taking courses. Each course in a given ￿eld of study provides
￿eld-speci￿c skills as well as a signal of match quality in that ￿eld. Later specialization provides
students with more time to learn about match quality in di⁄erent ￿elds but it a⁄ords less time
to acquire ￿eld-speci￿c skills after a ￿eld is chosen. Assuming that wages are increasing in both
￿eld-speci￿c skills and match quality, I show that later specialization is preferred when the return
to match quality is high relative to the return to speci￿c skills. Extending the model to allow for
switching to occupations which are unrelated to the chosen ￿eld of study, I predict that individuals
who switch ￿elds will earn lower wages than those who enter related ￿elds. This is because switching
is associated with a loss in speci￿c skills and because match quality conditional on switching is, on
average, lower. Moreover, since switching allows individuals to correct for poor choices made at
the point of specialization, this option should be more valuable in regimes where individuals are
required to specialize early. Consequently, the di⁄erence in expected wages between the early and
1In a survey of college students in the Boston area, Freeman (1971) ￿nds that most ￿nal career plans are made
during the college period, and that the choice of a college major and the choice of occupation are closely related.
2In a related paper, Malamud (2009), I exploit this exogenous di⁄erence in the timing of specialization to test
whether higher education provides students with information about their tastes and talents for di⁄erent ￿elds.
1late regime should diminish when switching is possible and the return to match quality is relatively
high.
I proceed to examine the labor market consequences of specializing early versus late by com-
paring across the English and Scottish undergraduate0 systems. In England, students apply to a
speci￿c ￿eld of study at a particular university while still in secondary school. Once admitted to
study a certain ￿eld, they usually follow a narrow curriculum that focuses on the chosen subject
and allows for few courses in other ￿elds. That is, English students are required to specialize early.
In contrast, Scottish students are typically admitted to a broad faculty rather than a speci￿c ￿eld.
They are required to take several di⁄erent subjects during their ￿rst two years before specializing
in a particular ￿eld. That is, Scottish students are required to generalize early and specialize late.
These di⁄erences in the timing of academic specialization between England and Scotland have ex-
isted for more than a century.3 Since the labor markets in England and Scotland are relatively
well integrated and macroeconomic policies are determined by a common government, Britain is a
particularly useful setting in which to examine the consequences of early and late specialization.
Using survey data on 1980 university graduates from England and Scotland, I ￿nd strong evi-
dence that individuals who switch to unrelated occupations earn lower initial wages. This con￿rms
one of the main predictions of the model.4 Although imprecise, estimates of wage di⁄erentials
between switchers and non-switchers suggest that the cost of switching may be higher in England
than in Scotland. Furthermore, since the likelihood of switching ￿elds is substantially higher in
England than in Scotland, the model suggests that students in England make more mistakes in
choosing their ￿eld of study and su⁄er a corresponding loss in speci￿c skills when trying to correct
it. Nevertheless, individuals who switch also experience greater wage growth so that most of the
wage di⁄erential becomes insigni￿cant after 6 years in the labor market. Finally, controlling for
demographic and occupational characteristics, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in average wages
and reported subjective satisfaction between individuals in England and Scotland. These ￿ndings
suggest that, while later specialization is bene￿cial during the initial years in the labor market,
wage di⁄erences between regimes with early and late specialization do not persist in later years.
The concept of academic specialization is closely related to the important distinction between
3More recently, many English institutions have begun to introduce course structures that include more breadth
and o⁄er greater ￿ exibility. This might suggest a growing perception that specializing too early may have some
drawbacks.
4This is consistent with evidence from the literature on ￿job mismatch￿showing that individuals who are over-
educated relative to their occupations or under-educated relative to their coworkers earn lower wages. See Sicherman
(1991) and Cohn and Kahn (1995) for the US; Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and McMillen et. al. (2007) for the UK.
2general and speci￿c education. In changing environments, general education may be more valuable
than speci￿c training.5 Moreover, general skills are often deemed more useful in implementing new
technologies. (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Welch, 1970) 6 In the context of academic specialization,
individuals who emerge from an educational system which requires early specialization will have
more speci￿c skills in a particular ￿eld, while their counterparts in a system that allows for later
specialization will have more skills in a range of ￿elds.7 Thus, according to the model I present in
this paper, regimes which allow for later specialization would, all things equal, be preferred when
there is substantial labor market volatility. However, with imperfect information about match
quality, I derive non-trivial predictions across di⁄erent educational systems even in the absence of
any labor market volatility.
In a static labor market with perfect information, Weiss (1971) shows that it is not optimal
to delay the investment in education or change occupations when human capital accumulation
is perfectly speci￿c to a particular occupation. Allowing for imperfect information about match
quality, I ￿nd that it may be better to delay specialization.8 Furthermore, the arrival of new
information about match quality may lead some individuals to switch to an occupation that is
unrelated to their chosen ￿eld of study. Note that, in this model, the process of learning about
match quality in a particular ￿eld is complementary to the acquisition of speci￿c skills in that
￿eld. Thus, in contrast to the competing tasks of on-the-job search and ￿rm speci￿c human capital
acquisition in Jovanovic (1979b), the trade-o⁄ associated with academic specialization arises not
between the accumulation of human capital and learning about match quality per se, but rather,
between the accumulation of human capital in a particular ￿eld and the possibility of learning
about match quality in alternative ￿elds.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops a simple model of academic specialization and
derives comparative static predictions across regimes with early and late academic specialization.
Section 3 extends the model to allow for switching to occupational ￿elds which are unrelated to
5Goldin (2001) suggests that high geographical and occupational mobility may explain the prominence of general
education in America, in contrast to the European tradition of vocational and apprenticeship training.
6Krueger and Kumar (2004a, 2004b) also argue that the specialized training favored in Europe may account for
the slowdown in European economic growth during periods of rapid technological change.
7Incorporating a notion of general skills by allowing labor market returns to depend on average skills across ￿elds
would make later specialization relatively more attractive. Allowing for spillovers in skills across ￿elds would also
tend to make later specialization more appealing because additional learning about match quality would be less costly
in terms of forgone skill acquisition.
8Altonji (1993) also develops a model where individuals learn their preference between two ￿elds of study by
attending college and Arcidiacono (2004) estimates a structural model of student learning, but neither considers the
role of academic specialization.
3￿elds of study. Section 4 explores the di⁄erences between the English and Scottish systems of higher
education in more detail. Section 5 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 6
presents results from the regression analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Academic Specialization
2.1 Setup
Suppose individuals take n courses in each of k ￿elds of study prior to specialization. Each course
in a given ￿eld provides ￿eld-speci￿c skill and a noisy signal of match quality in that ￿eld.9 In
specializing, individuals choose a ￿eld and take (N ￿ nk) additional courses in this chosen ￿eld of
study. After completing a total of N courses, individuals enter an occupation in their chosen ￿eld
of specialization. Assume that individuals are risk neutral and have identical prior distributions on
match quality for each ￿eld. Speci￿cally, assume that match quality, ￿i, in each ￿eld i is a random
draw from a normal distribution with the same mean and variance, so that ￿i ￿ N(￿;￿2
0). Match
quality is therefore uncorrelated across ￿elds. Match quality can include any ￿eld-speci￿c compo-
nent of education that a⁄ects wages ￿for example, inherent ability or interest which contributes
to productivity in a speci￿c ￿eld.10 Allowing for prior means and variances to di⁄er across ￿elds
is straightforward and does not alter the main results from the model so long as we abstract from
the possibility of switching ￿elds later on.
By taking courses in a given ￿eld, individuals will (i) accumulate ￿eld-speci￿c skills and (ii)
receive noisy signals of their match quality in that ￿eld. For simplicity, suppose that the quantity
of skills accumulated in a ￿eld, si, is equivalent to the number of courses spent studying that ￿eld.
Each course of study j in ￿eld i provides a signal of match quality in that ￿eld, xij = ￿i+"ij where
"ij ￿ N(0;￿2) and j = 1;:::;n. Noise in the signal may be due to any number of idiosyncratic
factors such as the quality of instruction or the particular circumstances of the student at the time.
I assume that skills are perfectly speci￿c to a particular ￿eld. Allowing for spillovers across ￿elds
would serve to dampen the tradeo⁄between match quality and skills since additional learning about
match quality would be less costly in terms of forgone skill acquisition.
The wage in ￿eld i upon entering the labor market is an increasing function of both match
9McCall (1990), Neal (1999), and Shaw (1987) extend the notion of job match quality presented by Johnson (1978)
and Jovanovic (1979a) to the occupational level and present evidence for learning about occupational match quality.
10In principle, we can broaden the de￿nition of match quality to include any ￿eld-speci￿c component that a⁄ects
utility (though we only have information on wages and crude measures of satisfaction in our data).
4quality and skills: wi = w(￿i;si) so that
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of the return to match quality relative to the return to speci￿c skills. More generally, we might
expect a di⁄erent functional form for wages across di⁄erent ￿elds.11 In the empirical analysis, I
compare outcomes for individuals controlling for ￿eld of study to account for mean di⁄erences in
wages across ￿elds. Finally, for the purposes of the empirical analysis, I suppose that individuals
only consider wages when making educational and occupational decisions. However, if instead, I
were to consider utility as a function of both wages and non-pecuniary factors as well, I would
derive analogous predictions for utility.
2.2 Choice of ￿eld at specialization
The posterior distribution of match quality after studying n courses in ￿eld i is a normal distribution
with mean ￿0
i and variance ￿0.12 And the quantity of skills in each ￿eld at the point of specialization
is s0 = n. Therefore, in specializing, risk neutral individuals with identical prior distributions across
￿elds will choose the ￿eld of study with the highest expected wages (based on their beliefs ￿0
i):









Since the quantity of speci￿c skills in each ￿eld is identical, individuals simply choose the ￿eld
with the highest posterior mean of match quality, i￿ = argmaxi=1;:::kf￿0
ig.13 Thus, the posterior
mean of match quality in the chosen ￿eld at the time of specialization will be ￿0
i￿.14 Introducing
risk aversion does not alter the decision at the point of specialization if the variances of the prior
distributions across ￿elds are identical; individuals would continue to choose the ￿eld with the
highest posterior mean. However, if more precise information is available about certain ￿elds at
the point of specialization (i.e. ￿2
0 varies by ￿eld), risk averse individuals could decide to choose
such ￿elds even when they are associated with lower posterior means.
11Berger (1988), Grogger and Eide (1995), Hamermesh and Donald (2006), and Rumberger and Thomas (1993),
provide evidence that earnings di⁄er by undergraduate major.
























(1970) for a detailed exposition.
13Strictly speaking, expected future wages should include expected skills rather than the quantity of skills at the
point of specialization. But since expected match quality and skills are separable and individuals are risk neutral,

















52.3 Optimal timing of specialization
Individuals who specialize later have less time to accumulate speci￿c skills in their chosen ￿eld of
study but receive more signals in each ￿eld prior to specialization. They will therefore have more
accurate assessments of their match quality in each ￿eld and be less likely to make a mistake in
choosing a ￿eld. Thus, the optimal point of specialization depends on the return to match quality
relative to the return to speci￿c skills:
Proposition 1 The optimal number of courses prior to specialization, n, is increasing in ￿=￿.
See the Mathematical Appendix for a formal proof. Now consider regimes with early and late
specialization: An early regime requires individuals to specialize after taking nE courses in each
￿eld; a late regime requires individuals to specialize after taking nL courses in each ￿eld, where
nE < nL. I now consider predictions on wages in a baseline case where no ￿eld switching is
permitted; that is, individuals must enter their chosen ￿eld of study. As before, speci￿c skills
will be lower and match quality will, on average, be higher for individuals in the late regime.
Hence, whether individuals in the early regime ultimately earn higher expected wages than their
counterparts in the late regime will depend on the return to match quality relative to the return
to ￿eld-speci￿c skills.
Corollary 1 A regime with late specialization, nL, will have higher wages than a regime with early













> ￿ > 0
The Mathematical Appendix provides a proof. Simulations of expected wages also show the
behavior of wages over a broad set of parameter values.15 Figure 1 plots expected wages for an
early and a late regime over the full range of relative returns to match quality which are normalized
by taking ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) so that (￿=￿) goes from 0 to 1 as ￿ goes from 0 to 1. When the relative
return to match quality is high, individuals who specialize later will earn higher wages.
15All simulations are based on 5000 repetitions for k = 2;N = 21;￿1 = ￿2 = 0;￿
2 = 100; and ￿
2
0 = 25. Early
regimes are characterized by n
E = 2; late regimes are characterized by n
L = 6. Expected wages are determined
according to E (wi) = E (￿￿i + ￿b si) where b si =
si
N=k + ￿ are normalized skills.
63 Academic Specialization with Field Switching
3.1 Decision on whether to switch
Now suppose that individuals can switch to an occupational ￿eld which is unrelated to their ￿eld
of study prior to entering the labor market. Following specialization, individuals take (N ￿ nk)
additional courses in the chosen ￿eld and receive more signals about match quality in the chosen
￿eld, i￿. The posterior distribution of match quality in the chosen ￿eld after (N ￿ nk) additional
signals will be updated to a normal distribution with mean ￿00
i￿ and variance ￿00. Moreover, the
quantity of skills in the chosen ￿eld prior to entering the labor market is s00 = n+(N ￿nk). So now,
given the opportunity to switch to another ￿eld prior to entering the labor market, individuals will
compare expected wages in the chosen ￿eld with expected wages in the next best ￿eld:













Intuitively, individuals will switch if the posterior mean of match quality in the chosen ￿eld falls
su¢ ciently far below the posterior mean of another ￿eld to overwhelm the loss in speci￿c skills from
switching. If individuals decide to switch, they will always choose the ￿eld with the second-highest
posterior mean since all ￿elds other than the one chosen are associated with the same quantity
of speci￿c skills and posterior variance. The decision whether to switch can therefore be framed
as a comparison between the ￿rst best ￿eld, i￿, and the ￿eld that was second best at the time of
specialization, ia. The ￿eld selected after the second stage is denoted i￿￿ where i￿￿ 2 fi￿;iag.
The probability of switching to an unrelated occupational ￿eld depends on the timing of spe-
cialization. Whether the probability of switching is higher in a regime with early or late academic
specialization depends, in turn, on the return to match quality relative to the return on speci￿c
skills. In an early regime, assessments of perceived match quality in the chosen ￿eld experience
relatively greater updating following specialization so individuals are more likely to realize they
made a mistake and hope to correct it by switching. However, individuals in an early regime also
lose more speci￿c skills by switching ￿elds. Hence, the probability of switching will be higher in
an early regime only when the relative return to match quality is su¢ ciently high.16 Allowing for
risk aversion reduces the likelihood of switching because the lower posterior variance of the chosen
16This result is expressed formally and proved in Malamud (2007), a companion paper which tests whether higher
education, in addition to providing speci￿c skills, also provides information about match quality in ￿elds of study.
7￿eld may be su¢ ciently valuable to risk averse individuals so as to prevent switching to a ￿eld with
a higher posterior mean. Since this trade-o⁄ is more extreme in the early regime where there is
greater updating, ￿eld switching will be reduced more in the early regime than in the late regime
due to the presence of risk aversion.
3.2 Choice of ￿eld at specialization
If the variance of priors on match quality are identical across ￿elds, individuals do not need to
consider the possibility of later switching when making their initial choice of ￿eld. However, allowing
prior variances on match quality to vary by ￿eld introduces option value considerations at the time
of specialization. Similar to the prediction derived by Miller (1984), individuals would then tend
to specialize in riskier ￿elds because they could switch in case of a bad realization.17 Moreover,
￿elds with a larger prior variance would have greater option value in the early regime than in a late
regime. With more signals following specialization, greater updating in an early regime generates
a higher probability that the ultimate posterior mean will surpass that of the chosen ￿eld. Hence,
individuals in an early regime will be more likely to choose a ￿eld with a lower posterior mean at
the point of specialization because of the greater option value. Since, on average, such ￿elds have
lower expected match quality than those with the highest posterior mean, we expect more ￿eld
switching in an early regime due to option value considerations.18 Finally, note that ￿elds of study
are assumed to provide only ￿eld-speci￿c skills. Therefore, the model does not necessarily predict
that individuals will choose a di⁄erent set of ￿elds in early and late regimes.
3.3 Wages
The quantity of speci￿c skills for individuals who switch to occupations unrelated to their chosen
￿eld of study is always lower than for those who enter related occupations. Furthermore, match
quality conditional on switching is generally lower since it is chosen ￿elds with lower match quality
that ultimately lead to bad signals and cause switching. Thus, on average, individuals who switch
will have lower levels of both match quality and speci￿c skills than those who do not switch:19
17Note, Miller (1984) models job matching as a multi-armed bandit process and derives predictions on the optimal
order of sampling jobs. The model of academic specialization in this paper is restricted to a two-stage selection
procedure but allows for the simultaneous sampling of di⁄erent ￿elds.
18However, this e⁄ect may be small because all ￿elds are sampled prior to specialization and the option value needs
to be greater than the di⁄erence in the posterior means of match quality between the relevant ￿elds. Furthermore,
the presence of risk aversion would counteract the bene￿ts of having high variance in the posterior distributions.
19Of course, the following proposition describes the relationship in the cross-section and not for countefactual
comparison by individuals. Since individuals decide optimally, those who decide to switch do better, in expectation,
8Proposition 2 Individuals who switch will have lower wages than those who do not switch:
E [w(￿i￿;s) j w(￿i￿;s) > w(￿ia;s)] ￿ E [w(￿ia;s) j w(￿ia;s) > w(￿i￿;s)] > 0
See the Mathematical Appendix for a formal proof. As an extension, suppose that individuals
continue to accumulate ￿eld-speci￿c skills on the job, either from on-the-job training or through
learning by doing. Then, if there are diminishing returns to speci￿c skills, individuals who switch
will have higher rates of wage growth since they begin with lower levels of speci￿c skills in their
occupational ￿elds.
The possibility of switching implies that some individuals in each regime will end up with lower
skills and higher match quality. Indeed, on average, those individuals who switch earn higher wages
than they would have earned in the baseline case without switching. However, since more mistakes
are made with early specialization, it is more valuable to be able to correct them through switching
in the early regime and we expect the di⁄erence in expected wages between the early and late
regime to be dampened when the return to match quality is relatively high.
Proposition 3 With ￿eld switching, a regime with late specialization, nL, will have higher wages
than a regime with early specialization, nE, if the return to match quality is su¢ ciently higher than












> ￿0 > 0
See the Mathematical Appendix for further discussion. Expected wages in an early and a late
regime are shown in Figure 2 for di⁄erent relative returns to match quality. Note that expected
wages in the early regime do converge towards expected wages in the late regime as the relative
return to match quality rises and more switching takes place. As in the case without switching,
this prediction indicates that the superiority of one regime over the other depends critically on the
relative returns to match quality and ￿eld-speci￿c skills.
4 Background: Higher Education in Britain
The British system of higher education provides a particularly appropriate setting in which to
examine the predictions of the model. Undergraduate education in England and Scotland, though
similar in aim and overall structure, varies widely in the timing of academic specialization. In
than they would have by remaining in their chosen ￿elds.
9England, students apply to a speci￿c ￿eld of study at a particular university.20 Once admitted
to a speci￿c ￿eld, English students usually follow a narrow curriculum that focuses on the main
￿eld and allows for little exposure to other ￿elds.21 Indeed, most universities in England require
students who change ￿elds of study to start university anew (though some do allow for limited
changes). In contrast, Scottish students are typically admitted to a broad faculty or school rather
than a department; in some universities, admission is to the university at large.22 Furthermore,
they are required to study several di⁄erent ￿elds during their ￿rst two years. As an undergraduate
prospectus for the University of Edinburgh explains:
￿You would normally take courses in three or more subjects in the ￿rst year and, commonly,
these are followed by second courses in at least two of the subjects in your second year. This
will then give you a choice from two, or even three, subjects to pursue to degree level, and you
can delay this decision until quite a late stage...In choosing courses to be taken in the ￿rst two
years, you can select from a very wide range of courses o⁄ered across several faculties.￿
Similar course structures exist in most Scottish universities. Scottish universities thus allow for
substantial choice among ￿elds of study within faculties and, to some degree, across faculties
as well.23 Moreover, students in Scotland are required to take a broader range of courses and
choose a ￿eld of study much later than their English counterparts.24 The Handbook for Students
and their Advisors of 1980-82 explains that ￿the standard English degree, whether in science,
humanities or social sciences, is a single subject honours degree￿whereas ￿universities in Scotland
had traditionally o⁄ered a wide range of subject options with multi-subject examinations at the
end of the ￿rst year.￿(pp. 17-18) This is also supported by empirical evidence provided in later
sections that the proportion of individuals who change their ￿eld of study between admission and
graduation in Scottish universities is substantially higher than in English universities. Given these
di⁄erences, it is quite natural to regard the English system of higher education as an early regime
and the Scottish system of higher education as a late regime.
There is some variation in the average length of the undergraduate degree between England and
Scotland. Although there is some heterogeneity among degrees within each nation, most English
20There are exceptions: for example, students at Cambridge University are accepted to a broad engineering faculty;
students at Keele University are ￿rst accepted to complete a year of ￿foundation studies￿ .
21Again, there are exceptions: Cambridge￿ s system of Tripos allows some ￿ exibility in making changes to courses
of study; the newer universities of Essex, Kent, and Lancaster allow students to study a broader range of subjects.
22For example, faculties at the University of Glasgow include Arts, Biomedical and Life Sciences, Education,
Engineering, Information and Mathematical Sciences, Law, Business and Social Sciences, Medicine, and Physical
Sciences.
23Note that changing ￿elds is not always possible. Certain professional faculties, such as medicine and law, are
more insular. Engineering is usually a separate faculty but changes from the physical sciences are often permitted.
24Numerous scholars of British educational systems have noted that Scottish institutions allow for later specializa-
tion than English ones: e.g. Evans (1976), Hunter (1971), Osborne (1967), Squires (1987).
10degrees are completed within 3 years whereas most Scottish degrees are completed within 4 years.
However, many Scottish students enter university after 6 years of secondary schooling rather than
the 7 years customary in England. According to this calculation, English and Scottish students who
attain a BA degree receive roughly the same number of years of schooling (and this is con￿rmed
in the data by examining the age of graduation). Loosely speaking, the ￿rst year of university in
Scotland may be said to correspond to the ￿nal year of secondary school in England. But even
so, since English students apply to university in the beginning of their ￿nal year of secondary
school while Scottish students only make their ￿nal choice of ￿eld at the end of their second year
of university, there is substantial di⁄erence in the timing of specialization.
The di⁄erence between English and Scottish universities arose from their unique respective
historical traditions. English universities were largely independent and free to set their curriculum
and course structures. The provincial civic universities established later in urban centers did not
substantially depart from the traditions of the ￿ancient￿universities. Even with the introduction
of broad faculties and additional courses of study, admissions remained at the departmental level.25
On the other hand, Scottish universities became regulated under the Universities (Scotland) Act of
1858 that set up an executive commission to draw up uniform conditions for courses of study. The
Universities (Scotland) Act of 1889 further increased the choice of subjects available in Scottish
universities, re￿ ecting the ￿traditional Scottish preference for a broad general education.￿(Hunter,
1971, p. 237) In large part, these two Acts of Scottish Parliament determined the distinctive
characteristics of universities in Scotland, including the emphasis on late academic specialization.
In addition to di⁄erences in higher education, England and Scotland also di⁄er in their system
of secondary school education. In England, students need GCE Advanced-level examinations (A-
levels) in 2 or 3 subjects to gain acceptance into university.26 In l989, a new exam, the Advanced
Supplementary examination (AS-level) was brought in to broaden the curriculum; it was to be
the same standard as an A-level, but half the content. Students were encouraged to substitute
two AS-levels for one of their A-levels but most universities did not regard these examinations as
commensurate alternatives and it did little to change the character of English secondary school
25The main exceptions arise in the (Plate Glass) universities established during the 1960s such as the University
of Keele which implemented an experimental modular curriculum.
26Interestingly, the introduction of A-levels in 1951 to replace the Higher School Certi￿cates was a response to the
criticism that these latter quali￿cations were denying opportunity to pupils with talent in individual subjects who
were less successful in others (especially in foreign language requirements). Indeed, the Higher School Certi￿cates
had attempted to ensure that pupils followed a su¢ ciently broad and balanced curriculum by requiring candidates
to achieve the minimum standard in a range of subjects for a pass. Dolton and Vignoles (2002) examine the e⁄ect of
choosing a broader set of courses in secondary school in the United Kingdon.
11education. In Scotland, on the other hand, students need SCE Higher Examinations in 5 or 6
subjects to gain acceptance into university.27 More recently, Advanced Highers and Higher Still
certi￿cations have been introduced to provide the opportunity for further specialization in secondary
school. However, universities continue to use Highers as the primary basis for admission and there
is little doubt that the Scottish system of secondary education provides a broader curriculum than
the English one. Again, the reasons for these di⁄erences in secondary school curriculum can be
traced to historical antecedents. In e⁄ect, specialization trickled down from the universities to
secondary schools. Moreover, the early in￿ uence of English universities on secondary school leaving
exams was far stronger than that of Scottish universities since Scottish secondary school leaving
certi￿cates had to be approved by the Scottish Education Department.
5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Data
Data for the empirical analysis come from the 1980 National Survey of Graduates and Diplomates
(NSGD). The NSGD was a national postal survey of some 8,000 graduates undertaken in 1986/7
by the British Department of Employment. It includes a random sample of one in six university
graduates and one in four of all leavers from other institutions in 1980 in Great Britain.28 The
NSGD contains information about their 1980 quali￿cation, their subsequent labor market experi-
ence (occupation, industry, and wages for ￿rst and current jobs) and further educational pursuits.
There is also information about their high school examination results and some questions regarding
satisfaction with the 1980 quali￿cation. Although it is not possible to identify speci￿c universities
in the NSGD, there is information on whether students took English or Scottish secondary school
leaving exams. Indeed, using school leaving exams as a proxy for type of degree serves to reduce
the bias associated with non-random migration to university.29 Since the NSGD is not represen-
tative of the overall population, we might be concerned that the English and Scottish samples of
27These Scottish quali￿cations evolved directly from the earlier Leaving and Intermediate Certi￿cates which re-
quired pro￿ciency over a group of subjects rather than in single subjects.
28I exclude graduates from polytechnics and other institutions from the present analysis. Engineering students in
Scottish universities are oversampled in the NSGD. Consequently, it is important to control for ￿elds of study with
the NSGD sample.
29While there is some choice available with the type of secondary school, through boarding school perhaps, it is
undoubtedly much less than in university (the correlation between Scottish residence and attendance in Scottish high
school is .96). Furthermore, few secondary schools in Scotland o⁄er English leaving examinations (the correlation
between attendance in a Scottish high school and sitting Scottish leaving examinations is .98).
12university graduates may not be comparable because of di⁄ering participation rates. Using two
nationally representative datasets which include all individuals born in Great Britain during one
week in 1958 and 1970 (the National Child Development Study and British Cohort Study respec-
tively), I calculated the percentage of individuals that have attained a ￿rst degree from university
by age 26. In both of these datasets, the participation rates to university are remarkably similar
between England and Scotland: 8% of the 1958 cohort and 12% of the 1970 cohort.
Table 1 shows the average characteristics for the sample of English and Scottish students used
in the regression analysis. The average age upon completion of the ￿rst degree is almost equivalent
among English and Scottish students. Although the average age that students begin university is
slightly lower in Scotland, the median age of students during their ￿rst year in university is 19 for
both England and Scotland (not shown). The raw GPA scores shown in Table 1 are converted
from letter grades in the A-level and Scottish Higher school leaving examinations. In the regression
analysis, these scores are normalized within nation so that coe¢ cients represent the e⁄ect of a one
standard deviation increase in GPA. The composition of broad ￿elds of study across the two nations
is not too dissimilar, especially after accounting for the oversampling of engineering students from
Scotland. Nevertheless, relatively more students in Scotland study life sciences, health sciences,
and business and relatively fewer study mathematical and social sciences. The majority of students
from England and Scotland enter employment in the UK. The lower rate of unemployment among
Scottish individuals is a consequence of the oversampling of engineering graduates who are less
likely to be unemployed than others.30
The model introduces an important distinction between individuals who enter an occupation
that is related to their ￿eld of study and those who switch to an unrelated occupation. I construct
a variable SWITCH that captures ￿eld switching by grouping ￿elds of study and occupations
into categories (see the Data Appendix for more details). As shown in Appendix Table 1, I allow
for three levels of classi￿cation: narrow (42 categories), broad (12 categories), and very broad (6
categories). Individuals are said to switch to an unrelated occupation when the ￿eld of study of their
degree and their occupational ￿eld are in di⁄erent categories, subject to the level of classi￿cation.
Therefore, a ￿eld switch is de￿ned as 1 if the occupational ￿eld is di⁄erent from the ￿eld of study
30Note, results from the IEA Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 1994-95 indicate
no signi￿cant di⁄erences between England and Scotland in the mathematics achievement for students in fourth and
eighth grade. There are, however, some di⁄erences in the science achievement scores. English students in the eight
grade appears to do somewhat better than their Scottish counterparts, although there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence for
fourth graders.
13at university, and 0 otherwise. Clearly, broader classi￿cations indicate lower rates of ￿eld switching
since only drastic changes from ￿elds of study to occupational ￿elds will register. However, the rate
of ￿eld switching is substantially lower in Scotland than in England according to all classi￿cations.
For example, in terms of the broad classi￿cation, the rate of ￿eld switching in Scotland is between
10 and 20 percentage points lower than the rate of ￿eld switching in England. Most of the empirical
analysis will focus on the broad classi￿cation of ￿elds.31
5.2 Empirical Strategy
The base sample includes all individuals who attained a BA degree in 1980 and were employed
full-time in the ￿rst year following completion of their quali￿cation. I exclude individuals pursuing
graduate studies while working because this may select for weaker students who need to work
while pursuing higher degrees. I explore a variety of alternative sampling restrictions: (i) including
graduate students who have occupation data, (ii) including unclassi￿ed occupations such as manual
and clerical occupations instead of coding them as switches since individuals in one nation may
be more likely to end up in non-professional occupations, (iii) coding individuals who end up
unemployed as switches since this may be the result of a di⁄erential macroeconomic shock across
the two nations, and (iv) excluding the ￿elds of education and business or coding individuals who
study them as non-switches since they are particularly subject to misclassi￿cation (and similarly
with combined ￿elds). Finally, I check that the ￿ndings hold for students with top high school
grades who are clearly free to choose their ￿elds, unconstrained by admissions requirements and
the availability of slots.
The theoretical predictions derived regarding wages are examined through the following regres-
sion model:
lnwij = ￿0Xij + ￿SCOTij + ￿SWITCHij + ￿ (SCOTij ￿ SWITCHij) + ￿j + "ij (1)
where lnwij is log annual earnings for individual i in ￿eld j, SCOTij is a dummy variable indicating
the individual received a Scottish degree and therefore specialized late, SWITCHij is a dummy
variable for a ￿eld switch, ￿j is a set of ￿eld of study e⁄ects, Xij are demographic characteristics, and
"ij is a disturbance term. The primary demographic controls include sex, age, marital status, high
31These include: Math/Computer Sciences, Physical Sciences, Architecture, Engineering, Biological Sciences,
Health, Social Services, Social Sciences, Business, Law, Education, and Arts.
14school GPA, parental socioeconomic status, as well as controls for region of work and industry.
Since the log function is a positive monotonic transformation, all of the predictions derived in
Section 3 on wages will also hold for log wages. ￿ captures the di⁄erence in wages between England
and Scotland among individuals that do not experience ￿eld switching. ￿ captures the di⁄erential
in wages in England between individuals who switch and those who do not switch. Finally, ￿
captures the di⁄erence between Scotland and England in the di⁄erential associated with switching.
Other parameters of interest include the wage di⁄erential from switching for individuals in Scotland
(￿ + ￿) and the wage di⁄erence between English and Scottish individuals who switch (￿ + ￿). All
wage regressions use the type of high school leaving examinations as a proxy for the type of degree.
Although I am primarily interested in estimating wage regressions, I also consider the e⁄ect of
a Scottish degree on the probability of switching:
SWITCHij = ￿0Xij + ￿SCOTij + ￿j + ￿ij (2)
where SWITCHij and SCOTij are as de￿ned in equation 1. The set of controls, Xij, includes
sex, age, marital status, high school GPA, and parental socioeconomic status. Some speci￿cations
also include ￿eld of study e⁄ects and controls for region of work. In this regression, ￿ captures the
di⁄erence between England and Scotland in the likelihood of switching. Again, I use the type of
school leaving examinations (whether Scottish or English) to estimate a reduced form equation of
the probability of ￿eld switching.
6 Results
6.1 Wages
Wage regressions are presented in Table 2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) explore the e⁄ects on wages
in the ￿rst job held in the ￿rst year after completing a BA degree, while columns (4), (5), and (6)
examine the e⁄ects on wages in the job held six years after completing a BA degree. In addition to
gender, marital status, age, high school GPA, all wage regressions include controls for ￿eld of study,
industry, and region of work since wages may di⁄er markedly across ￿elds, regions, and industry for
other reasons. Column (1) reveals that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in average annual earnings
between England and Scotland in the ￿rst year following completion of the degree ￿the coe¢ cient
on SCOT from equation (1) is not statistically signi￿cant. But column (2) provides strong evidence
15in support of the theoretical prediction that individuals who switch to an occupation unrelated to
their ￿eld of study at university earn lower wages in the ￿rst year (1981) ￿ the coe¢ cient on
SWITCH is negative and signi￿cant. Indeed, ￿eld switching is associated with a substantial wage
loss of around 7 percentage points, comparable in magnitude to the negative wage di⁄erential for
women in this sample.32 The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on SCOT ￿ SWITCH in column (3)
suggests that the di⁄erential associated with ￿eld switching is larger in England than Scotland but
the estimate is rather imprecise.
Column (4) shows that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in average annual earnings between
England and Scotland after six years in 1986/87. Interestingly, columns (5) and (6) indicate that
individuals who switched to an occupation unrelated to their ￿eld of study at university in the ￿rst
year earn average annual wages six years later that are no di⁄erent than their counterparts who
did not switch. In other words, controlling for background variables, individuals who experience
￿eld switching appear to make up the di⁄erence over time. Figure 3 plots log wages in 1981 and
1986/87 predicted on the basis of observable characteristics from the wage regressions of Table 2;
speci￿cally, columns (3) and (6). Although insigni￿cant, the di⁄erential in initial wages between
those who switch and those who do not switch does appear to be larger in England than in Scotland.
Robustness checks for all these ￿ndings are presented in columns (2), (3), and (4) of Appendix Table
2.
Part of the wage loss among individuals who switch to unrelated occupations may be associated
with unobservables which are correlated with ￿eld switching rather than a direct causal e⁄ect.
However, it is important to distinguish between two types of unobserved variables. Although we
try to control for ability using high school achievement and success in university, individuals may
have additional unobservable traits that a⁄ect wages. For example, individuals who are particularly
indecisive and therefore switch ￿elds, as suggested in the previous section, may have ended up
earning lower wages in any case.33 In the model of academic specialization presented earlier,
switching ￿elds is endogenous yet individuals switch ￿elds because they receive new information
on match quality and not because of some unobserved characteristics. Shocks to information on
match quality will generally be unobservable.34 But these re￿ ect the inherent uncertainty in the
32Using this same data, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) ￿nd that UK graduates who are overeducated relative to their
reported job requirements earn singi￿cantly lower wages than their peers.
33While I don￿ t ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on SWITCH is a⁄ected when controlling for whether individuals changed
￿elds of study during university, it may still capture some unobservable traits that di⁄er across individuals.
34College grades may serve as a useful proxy for these unobservable shocks. However, this is not available in this
16process of learning about match quality rather than an innate trait. The fact that individuals who
switch tend to catch up with their counterparts who did not switch suggests that this may be the
more important explanation for the initial wage loss associated with switching.
That individuals who experience ￿eld switching make up the di⁄erence in wages over time is
interesting but not necessarily surprising. Recall that predictions on wage growth depended on
additional assumptions. If ￿eld-speci￿c skills are also accumulated on the job but these skills
have diminishing returns, we would expect that ￿eld switching is associated with greater wage
growth in the early years after graduation. Table 4 shows the growth in annual wages over the
six years following completion of a BA degree. With coe¢ cients on SWITCH that are almost
signi￿cant, columns (2) and (3) suggest that individuals who switch to an unrelated occupation
upon entering the labor market experience greater wage growth than their counterparts who do
not switch. Moreover, although insigni￿cant, the signs on SCOT and SCOT ￿ SWITCH accord
with the general intuition: individuals who switch in Scotland experience lower wage growth than
their English counterparts since they have higher levels of speci￿c skills upon entering the labor
market; individuals who do not switch in Scotland experience greater wage growth than their
English counterparts since they have lower levels of speci￿c skills upon entering the labor market.
6.2 Field Switching
Table 3 examines ￿eld switching between England and Scotland. We estimate a reduced-form
equation where SCOT is a dummy variable identifying whether students took English or Scottish
secondary school leaving exams. All regressions include controls for gender, marital status, age,
SES level, and high school GPA. In column (1), I estimate the di⁄erence in the probability of
￿eld switching between England and Scotland without controlling for ￿elds of study or region of
work. Similar to the raw di⁄erence shown in Table 1, the estimated di⁄erence in ￿eld switching
is approximately 15 percentage points, which is substantial given that the rate of ￿eld switching
in Scotland is about .34. Once I control for the composition of ￿elds across nations in column
(2), the estimated di⁄erential in ￿eld switching declines substantially. In other words, not only do
individuals in Scotland switch less, but they also tend to study ￿elds that are associated with less
switching.35 In column (3), I add controls for region of work and the coe¢ cient on SCOT becomes
context because students in Britain do not take modular courses, each with a separate grade.
35While it is possible that English students wish to choose ￿elds which facilitate switching in order to avoid
specializing in an excessively narrow ￿eld, the number of slots in each ￿eld in England is essentially determined by
government funding.
17insigni￿cant, suggesting that there may be di⁄erent preferences for related quali￿cations among
employers in England and Scotland. However, this speci￿cation needs to be interpreted with care
since the decision to work in England or Scotland is probably endogenous; individuals who decide
to switch may also make systematically di⁄erent decisions about where they wish to work.
The NSGD also contains information on student outcomes six years following the completion
of their degree. Columns (4), (5), and (6) indicate that the di⁄erential in ￿eld switching between
England and Scotland remains after six years. Even stronger results are obtained if we consider all
individuals employed six years following completion of the BA degree by including those who were
not employed in the ￿rst year after completing their degree (results not shown). This suggests that
individuals in England continue to experiment more than individuals in Scotland once in the labor
market. Robustness checks for all these ￿ndings are presented in column (4) of Appendix Table
2. Since the likelihood of switching ￿elds is substantially higher in England than in Scotland, the
model suggests that more students in England su⁄er a loss in speci￿c skills when trying to correct
mistakes in their initial choice of ￿eld. Thus, at least during the initial years of labor market
experience, a regime with early specialization appears to be associated with more costly switches
than one with later specialization.
6.3 Other results
Although outside the scope of the model proper, I also consider several labor market outcomes
over time. The preceding section already examined the results on wage growth from Table 4.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 4 explore occupational mobility which is de￿ned as a further
change in occupational ￿eld following entry into the labor market.36 Individuals who experience
￿eld switching are signi￿cantly more likely to change to a job in a di⁄erent occupational ￿eld after
several years. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis because individuals who switch have
the same level of speci￿c skills in alternative ￿elds so that further changes in occupation are not as
severely penalized. Again, it is important to keep in mind that some individuals who switch may
simply be inherently less stable workers. Furthermore, among individuals who do not switch, those
in Scotland are signi￿cantly less likely to change to another occupation in later years.
Finally, respondents in the NSGD were asked: ￿On re￿ ection, how bene￿cial has your [1980]
36On a related note, there appear to be no signi￿cant di⁄erences in formal job training between England and
Scotland. Nonetheless, there may still be greater informal learning on the job for Scottish individuals to make up for
lower levels of skill upon entering the labor market.
18quali￿cation been to you in:￿(i) getting an interesting job; (ii) securing a good income; and (iii)
becoming a widely educated person. Based on simple unconditional means, Scottish individuals
report higher levels of getting an interesting job than their English counterparts (but these are only
marginally signi￿cant). Table 5 highlights regression results from these subjective assessments.37
Individuals who switch to an occupation unrelated to their ￿eld of study are signi￿cantly less likely
to consider their quali￿cation bene￿cial in obtaining an interesting job. Indeed, this e⁄ect remains
strong even after controlling for wages, subjective assessments of securing a good income, and
￿elds of study. It is possible that individuals who switch consider themselves as having interesting
jobs but not as a direct result of their quali￿cation. Nevertheless, this provides some suggestive
evidence for the non-pecuniary bene￿ts of entering an occupation related to the ￿eld of study
at university. Individuals who experience ￿eld switching are signi￿cantly more likely to report
that their quali￿cation contributed to their becoming more widely educated. However, this e⁄ect
becomes insigni￿cant once controls for ￿eld of study are included, suggesting that individuals
who consider themselves widely educated were the ones that selected certain ￿elds of study with
particularly high rates of switching (e.g. humanities and social sciences).
7 Conclusion
Specialization is a fundamental feature of many economic decisions. This paper examines the trade-
o⁄ between the acquisition of speci￿c skills early in one￿ s college education versus broader training
and learning about match quality in di⁄erent ￿elds of study. I develop a model of specialization in
which individuals accumulate ￿eld-speci￿c skills and receive noisy signals of match quality by taking
courses in di⁄erent ￿elds of study. I also extend the model to allow for switching to occupations
which are unrelated to the chosen ￿eld of study upon entry into the labor market. Then I derive and
test comparative static predictions between regimes with early and late specialization across the
corresponding English and Scottish systems of higher education. I ￿nd strong evidence in support
of the prediction that individuals who switch to unrelated occupations experience lower initial
wages. Though not signi￿cant, the sign of the wage di⁄erential associated with switching suggests
a larger wage penalty in England than Scotland. Moreover, since the probability of switching
￿elds is substantially higher in England than Scotland, more individuals in England su⁄er a loss
37These regressions are run as ordered probits. Categories include: ￿not at all￿ , ￿a little￿ , ￿a lot￿ , and ￿a great
deal￿ . Similar results are obtained when collapsing these categories into larger groupings.
19in initial wages. Nevertheless, I also ￿nd that individuals who switch tend to experience greater
wage growth so that wage di⁄erences between those who do and do not switch become insigni￿cant
after 6 years in the labor market. Furthermore, controlling for demographic and occupational
characteristics, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in average wages or reported subjective satisfaction
between England and Scotland. Together, these ￿ndings suggest that, while early specialization is
associated with more costly switches upon entering the labor market, di⁄erences in wages across
educational systems with early and late specialization do not persist over time.
How should we interpret the absence of signi￿cant di⁄erences in average earnings between
England and Scotland? Based on the model, this result suggests that the bene￿ts to higher match
quality from later specialization is roughly in balance with the bene￿ts to more speci￿c skills from
early specialization. On the other hand, the pattern of switching indicates that the return to match
quality is relatively high as compared with the return to speci￿c skills. There are several ways to
reconcile these ￿ndings. First, it is possible that the bene￿ts of later specialization are mostly
associated with non-pecuniary considerations which are captured by ￿eld switching but missed in
a measure of wages. Second, as explained in the discussion of Proposition 3 and shown in Figure
2, di⁄erences between early and late specialization tend to diminish when switching is possible
and the return to match quality is relatively high, because individuals in the early regime are able
to correct for their initial mistakes. Finally, there is a range of parameter values for the relative
return to match quality where both regimes yield similar returns even though the early regime has
a higher rate of switching.38 Distinguishing between these alternative explanations is an important
area for further research.
Whether one regime is preferred to another also depends on other structural parameters, such
as the accuracy of information on match quality prior to commencing education. A lower prior
variance on match quality would imply that a shorter period of experimentation is more valuable.
Hence, if certain populations have more accurate information about their match quality, a regime
with early specialization may not necessarily lead to many costly mistakes. Indeed, with a hetero-
geneous population, the bene￿ts associated with early or late specialization may accrue to di⁄erent
individuals. The theoretical model abstracts from distributional concerns by assuming that indi-
viduals are identical but these considerations may, in fact, be important in evaluating di⁄erent
38This can occur when the relative return to match quality at which the probability of switching in the early regime
crosses that of the late regime is below the relative return to match quality at which the expected wages in the late
regime cross those of the early regime.
20systems of higher education. In a broader sense, however, both distributional considerations and
possible ine¢ ciencies arise because individuals are forced to specialize at a particular time. Al-
lowing individuals to choose when to specialize should be optimal, especially with a heterogenous
population.
The American system of higher education is often cited as an example of an educational system
with a broad undergraduate curriculum and relatively late specialization. However, though the
U.S. has a strong liberal arts tradition that emphasizes general education and allows for later spe-
cialization, American undergraduates can exploit their elective courses and specialize early, if they
wish. The U.S. system of higher education is not so much characterized by a broad curriculum and
late specialization as by ￿ exibility in breadth and timing of academic specialization. As mentioned
above, a system that allows individuals to choose when to specialize should be optimal if students
have su¢ cient information to experiment in a productive fashion. But if there is some lumpiness
in human capital investments and students do not have su¢ cient information to experiment in a
productive manner, such ￿ exibility can lead students to end up with unproductive programs of
study. Thus, Trow (1999) has argued that American undergraduates often take incoherent courses
of study and indulge in excessive experimentation. Examining whether the ￿ exibility of the Ameri-
can educational system can improve on both the English and Scottish systems would be a valuable
next step in extending our knowledge of academic specialization.
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24A Data Appendix
Complete documentation for the National Survey of 1980 Graduates and Diplomates, 1986-1987
are available from the UK Data Archive: http://www.data-archive.ac.uk. Details of the variables
constructed for this study are described as follows:
Field switch
A ￿eld switch is de￿ned as a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if an individual is
employed in an occupation that is unrelated to his major ￿eld of study at the undergraduate level,
and 0 otherwise. In order to determine whether an individual is employed in an occupation that is
related or unrelated to his ￿eld of study, I group ￿elds of study and occupations into categories. As
shown in Appendix Table 1, I allow for three gradations of classi￿cation: narrow (42 categories),
broad (12 categories), and very broad (6 categories). Occupations and ￿elds of study are coded
according to each of the alternative classi￿cations. Where the occupation and ￿eld of study are
classi￿ed in di⁄erent categories, the ￿eld switch variable takes on a value of 1. For example,
an individual that studies physics at university will have their ￿eld of study coded as ￿physics￿
according the narrow classi￿cation, ￿physical sciences￿according to the broad classi￿cation, and
￿mathematical, computer, and physical sciences￿according to the very broad classi￿cation. If this
individual is employed as a computer programmer, the ￿eld switch variable will take on a value of
1 according to the narrow and broad classi￿cations and a value of 0 according to the very broad
classi￿cation. Combined ￿elds are considered switches if the individual is not employed in any of
the ￿elds mentioned. I focus on the broad classi￿cation in most of the analysis in this paper. I also
consider ￿eld switching from the graduate level. This variable is de￿ned analogously except that
the ￿eld of study is the one studied at the graduate level.
High school GPA
Scores on secondary school leaving exams are o¢ cially coded as letter grades (A, B, C, etc.).
These are converted into numerical scores where A=10, B=8, C=6, D=4, and E=2. Average scores
are then standardized by nation and combined so that the overall distribution of high school GPA
has mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
SES
Individual SES scores are based on parental occupations as follows: 0-unstated, retired, or
unknown, 1-professionals workers, 2-intermediate workers, 3-skilled non-manual, 4-skilled manual,
5-partially skilled, 6-unskilled, and 7-unemployed.
Region of Work
Region of work is classi￿ed as London, Southern England, Midlands, East Anglia, Northern
England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland or abroad.
Industry
Industry are classi￿ed according to broad SIC codes: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (0),
Mining (1), Mineral Extraction and Production (2), Heavy Manufacturing (3), Light Manufacturing
(4), Construction (5), Wholesale and Retail Trade (6), Transportation, Communication, and Public
Utilities (7), Financial and Business Services (8), Professional and Related Services (9)
Wages
Wages are annual earnings as reported by individuals in a retrospective survey. Accurate
measures of wages are available at two times: starting wages in the ￿rst job and ￿current wages￿
in the last job reported approximately 6 years after completing the ￿rst degree.
25B Mathematical Appendix
The mathematical appendix provides a formal treatment of the model of academic specialization
presented in the main text. For ease of exposition, the structure of the appendix and most of the
notation parallels the main text.
Formal Setup
Suppose N courses are taken in k ￿ 2 ￿elds of study. Let F1;:::;Fk be normal populations
associated with ￿elds of study i = 1;:::;k, each with unknown mean ￿1;:::;￿k and a common
known variance ￿2 > 0. The unknown means ￿1;:::;￿k represent unobserved match quality in
each ￿eld.
Sequence of observations
In Stage 1, n observations from each population Fi are observed. These correspond to observa-
tions on match quality from courses taken in each ￿eld of study prior to specialization. The sample
means of these observations, Xi, are independent and distributed N
￿
￿i;p￿1￿
with p = n￿￿2. In
Stage 2, one population, i￿, is selected for further sampling and (N ￿ nk) additional observations
are observed from this population. These correspond to observations on match quality in the chosen
￿eld from courses taken following specialization. The sample mean of the second set of observa-
tions, Y , is distributed N
￿
￿i￿;q￿1￿
with q = (N ￿ nk)￿￿2 and where ￿i￿ is the (unknown) mean
of the population chosen after Stage 1.39
Beliefs on match quality
Belief about match quality ￿1;:::;￿k are represented by the parameters b ￿1;:::;b ￿k. These pa-
rameters are random and follow independent and identical prior distributions assumed to have
b ￿i ￿ N
￿
￿;￿￿1￿
with ￿ = ￿￿2
0 . The conditional distribution of b ￿ at each stage can be expressed as
follows:







; i = 1;:::;k independent







; qi￿ = q and 0 otherwise
where ￿ = p + ￿ represents the relative combined (prior plus sampling) information gained from
￿eld Fi, and where ￿i(x) = (pxi + ￿￿)=(p + ￿) represents the estimated mean of ￿eld Fi after
Stage 1. In terms of the notation in the main text, ￿0
i = ￿i(x) and ￿00
i = ￿i(x;y) .40
Payo⁄s
The payo⁄ associated with ￿eld Fi is denoted by wi = ￿￿i + ￿si where si is the cumulative
number of observations from ￿eld Fi. This payo⁄ represents the wage received in ￿eld i upon
entering the labor market. In terms of the model of academic specialization, ￿ is the return to
match quality and ￿ is the return to speci￿c skills. Note that we can express the loss function
associated with population Fi as Li (￿;s) = ￿￿￿i ￿ ￿si
41
Decision rules
39Since Xi and Yi￿ already correspond to the mean of the samples, we will use xi and yi￿instead of xi and yi￿.
40Note also that the conditional distribution of Y given X = x is distributed N (￿i(x);w) with w = (￿ + q)￿q.
41This corresponds to a linear loss function, Li (￿;s) = ￿[k] ￿ ￿i, where ￿[k] = maxf￿1;:::;￿kg is normalized to
zero and with an additional negative cost associated with the amount of sampling from the population i.
26After X = x has been observed at Stage 1, the Bayes selection rule i￿ = d￿
1 (x) can be found


























￿i(x) + ￿s = ￿
￿




where s corresponds to the speci￿c skills in each ￿eld which are equivalent across ￿elds. The
optimal selection, i￿, at Stage 1 will therefore be the population with the largest observed sample
mean after Stage 1 since d￿
1 (x) = argmaxi=1;:::;k xi. This is intuitive since, with identical prior
distributions on match quality, the only distinguishing feature of each population is the information
received in Stage 1. Let x[1] < x[2] < ￿￿￿ < x[k] denote the order sample means from Stage 1 and
￿[1](x) < ￿[2](x) < ￿￿￿ < ￿[k](x) denote the ordered posterior means from Stage 1. Note that, in
terms of the notation in the main text, ￿0
i￿ = ￿[k](x) and ￿0
ia = ￿[k￿1](x).
















￿b ￿i + ￿si j X = x;Y = y
￿
These Bayes selection rules yield the maximum posterior expected wages, or Bayes risk, of their
respective problems in Stages 1 and 2. Let ￿00
i￿ = ￿[k](x;y) denote the posterior mean of ￿eld, i￿,
after Stage 2. An important feature of this decision problem is that the selection i￿￿ = d￿
2 (x;y)
after Stage 2 may di⁄er from the selection i￿ = d￿
1 (x) after Stage 1 since further observations in
Stage 2 may reveal that the initial choice was not as good as initially thought. This corresponds
precisely to the possibility of switching ￿elds expressed in the main theoretical framework.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the case where switching after Stage 2 is not possible. In this case, the optimal choice
of the number of observations, n, sampled from each population in Stage 1, on the Bayes risk
associated with the selection in Stage 1 can be determined by maximizing the following expression
with respect to n:



















￿ n￿ (k ￿ 1) + ￿N
where ￿2 =
p
v (p + v)
=
n
nv + ￿2v2 and Z[k] ￿ max
i=1;:::;k
Zi where Zi ￿ N (0;1)
The last equality follows from a result in order statistics: essentially, we express the maximum
of ￿i(X) in terms of its z-score, the maximum of standard normal distributions Zi (see Afonja,





represents the return to match quality while [N ￿ n(k ￿ 1)] represents the return from
speci￿c skills in choosing ￿eld i￿. Taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to
n, setting it equal to zero, and simplifying yields the optimal number of observations, n￿, to be
sampled in Stage 1:
n￿ ￿





2￿ (k ￿ 1)
!2
The unique positive root of the equation above represents the optimal number of observations, n￿.43
The optimal n is clearly increasing in ￿=￿ and decreasing in k. In other words, a regime with late
specialization, nL, will yield higher wages than a regime with early specialization, nE, if the return
to match quality is su¢ ciently higher than the return to speci￿c skills.





















where ￿L and ￿E are the ￿ for the regime with late and early specialization respectively. So a regime
with late specialization is preferred if the returns to match quality are large relative to returns to
speci￿c skills.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the case where all switches are exogenous: i.e. some
individuals are forced to switch without regard to the signals they receive in the Stage 2. In this
case, the di⁄erence in expected wages between those individuals who switch and those who do
not switch will simply be E [w(￿i￿;s)] ￿ E [w(￿ia;s)]. Following the derivation in the proof of
proposition 1, this expression can be shown to be strictly positive:






































> 0 where Z[k] ￿ max
i
Zi; Z[k￿1] ￿ max
i6=i￿ Zi and Zi ￿ N (0;1)
In the actual model, however, switching is endogenous. Consequently, expected wages have to be
evaluated conditional on beliefs about the wages expected from switching and from not switching:
E [w(￿i￿;s) j w(￿00
i￿;s) > w(￿0
ia;s)] ￿ E [w(￿ia;s) j w(￿0
ia;s) > w(￿00
i￿;s)]. These can be expressed
42In other words, ￿
2 = V ar(m(x)) where m(x) =
R
￿i(x j ￿)f (￿) d￿. Wetherill and Ofosu determine ￿
2 in an
analogous framework ￿see equation (9.5) on page 263.
43This equation is equivalent to equation (27) of Dunnett (1960). For the case of k = 2, it is also equivalent to an
equation derived by Bross (1950) since E [max(Z1;Z2)] = 1=
p
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￿[k￿1](x) j ￿[k￿1](x) < ￿
i
+ ￿n
￿ = ￿[k￿1](x) ￿
￿
q





(N ￿ nk) , ￿=￿[k](x) +
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q






Since these expressions are essentially the distributions associated with exogenous switching but
truncated from above and below, it is clear that E [w(￿i￿;s) j w(￿00
i￿;s) > w(￿0
ia;s)] > E [w(￿i￿;s)]
and that E [w(￿ia;s) j w(￿0
ia;s) > w(￿00
i￿;s)] < E [w(￿ia;s)]. Hence, the di⁄erence remains positive
in the case of endogenous switching.
Remarks on Proposition 3. In the case where switching after Stage 2 is possible, deter-
mining the optimal number of observations, n, sampled from each population in Stage 1 requires
us to evaluate E [w(￿i￿￿;s)]. Using the standard notation from earlier proofs, we can rewrite this





















￿￿[k](X) + qY [k]
￿ + q

































+ ￿ (nk ￿ N) < 0
The ￿rst two terms represent the returns to match quality and speci￿c skills as in the case where no
switching is permitted. The impact of switching is captured by the ￿nal term which is non-negative
in expectation since Y is distributed with mean ￿[k](X). Clearly, the possibility of switching can
only serve to increase expected wages. Note that ￿[k] (x) < 0 since switching will lead to a loss in
speci￿c skills ￿ (nk ￿ N) < 0 and a loss in match quality ￿[k￿1](X) ￿ ￿[k](X) < 0.












with respect to n. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to evaluate it analytically. However, we can see that the term ￿ will diminsh in importance when ￿
is large relative to ￿. Intuitively, if the returns to speci￿c skills are large, then we don￿ t expect much
switching to take place in any case. When ￿ is large relative to ￿, the derivative of ￿[k] (X) with
respect to n will be negative. Then ￿ will be decreasing with n and provide a countervailing weight




which is increasing with n. Therefore, allowing for the possibility
of switching implies that the highest bene￿t to switching will occur when n is small. In other
words, the possibility of switching is more valuable in a regime with early specialization than one
with later specialization. Again, this is intuitive given that more mistakes are made with early
specialization and it is therefore more valuable to be able to correct them through switching. The





lead a regime with early specialization to dominate the one with late specialization for all ￿=￿.
Simulations suggest that this possibility is unlikely.
29Table 1: Summary Statistics for 1980 College Graduates 
 England    Scotland 
 Mean  SD  Obs    Mean  SD  Obs 
Individual characteristics            
Female 0.34  0.47  1,242    0.31  0.47  213 
Married (6 years after degree)  0.53  0.50  1,242    0.59  0.49  213 
Average age (upon completion)  22.01  1.51  1,242    22.26  2.40  213 
High School GPA (out of 30)  19.71  5.84  1,242    18.25  5.77  213 
Number of high school subjects  3.18  0.69  1,242    5.15  1.04  213 
Degree characteristics            
Math and Computer Sciences  0.08  0.26  1,242    0.04  0.19  213 
Physical Sciences  0.15  0.35  1,242    0.08  0.26  213 
Architecture 0.02  0.13  1,242    0.02  0.15  213 
Engineering 0.21  0.41  1,242    0.30  0.46  213 
Life Sciences  0.07  0.25  1,242    0.08  0.27  213 
Health Sciences  0.04  0.20  1,242    0.05  0.22  213 
Social Services and Welfare  0.03  0.17  1,242    0.02  0.14  213 
Social Sciences  0.19  0.39  1,242    0.15  0.36  213 
Business/Accounting 0.04  0.21  1,242    0.06  0.24  213 
Law 0.01  0.11  1,242    0.10  0.30  213 
Education 0.03  0.17  1,242    0.04  0.20  213 
Art 0.13  0.34  1,242    0.06  0.23  213 
Occupational switching            
Very broad classification  0.44  0.50  1,242    0.29  0.45  213 
Broad classification  0.50  0.50  1,242    0.34  0.48  213 
Narrow classification  0.63  0.48  1,242    0.51  0.50  213 
Labor market outcomes            
Log earnings after 1 year  8.43  0.32  1,173    8.38  0.37  206 
Log earnings after 6 years  9.12  0.47  1,173    9.09  0.42  206 
Region of work            
England 0.87  0.33  1,242    0.25  0.44  213 
Scotland 0.02  0.13  1,242    0.71  0.46  213 
Wales 0.03  0.18  1,242    0.00  0.07  213 
Northern Ireland  0.00  0.06  1,242    0.00  0.00  213 
Abroad 0.07  0.26  1,242    0.03  0.18  213 
Additional outcomes (full sample)             
Entering employmentª  0.62  0.49  3,663    0.64  0.48  538 
Further Studyª  0.28  0.45  3,663    0.29  0.45  538 
Unemployedª 0.10  0.31  3,663    0.07  0.25  538 
 
Notes: The base sample for the 1980 National Survey of Graduates and Diplomates (NSGD) includes all individuals who attained 
a BA degree in 1980 and were employed in a job during the 1st year following graduation and not pursuing graduate studies. 
Median age at the start of the degree is 19 for both nations. GPA is an average measure of the achievement in secondary school 
leaving exams out of 30 (but standardized by nation in all regressions). Honors is a measure of success at university standardized 
across nations taking descrete values from 0 (no honors) to 4 (highest honors). Occupational switch is defined as 1 if field of 
study at the undergraduate level is different from the occupational field of first job 6 months following degree and 0 otherwise 
(see Data Appendix for further discussion of classification groups). Log wages are both expressed in 1981 pounds after deflating 
using the consumer price index. Composition of fields of study and occupational fields are based on a broad classification (other 
classifications are discussed in the Data Appendix). Foreign students returning overseas are excluded from counts of Post-BA 
activity. ª
  is out of the unrestricted sample including unemployed and graduate students. 
  30Table 2: The Effect of Scottish Degree and Occupational Switching on Log Annual Earnings 
dependent variable: log annual earnings 
  1
st year after completing degree     6
th  year after completing degree  
  (1) (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.033   -0.057    -0.014    -0.034  SCOT  [0.035]   [0.034]    [0.050]    [0.053] 
 -0.061*  -0.070**      0.003  -0.004  SWITCH 
 [0.026]  [0.026]      [0.029]  [0.030] 
   0.069        0.057  SCOT*SWITCH 
   [0.049]        [0.057] 
              
Main controls  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Field of study effects  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Region of work effects  X  X  X    X  X  X 
              
R
2 0.24  0.24  0.25    0.31  0.31  0.31 
Observaations 1,379  1,379  1,379    1,374  1,374  1,374 
Mean of dep. variable  8.43  8.43  8.43    9.12  9.12  9.12 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in brackets. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Sample 
includes all students who aimed to attain a first degree in England and Scotland with occupation data and were not pursing 
further studies. Dependent variable in columns (1), (2), and (3) is defined as log annual earnings in the 1st year after completion 
of an undergraduate degree. Dependent variable in columns (4), (5), and (6) is defined as log annual earnings in the 6th year after 
completion of an undergraduate degree (deflated to 1981 pounds). SWITCH is defined as 1 if the broad field of study is different 
from the broad occupational field of first job in the 1st year following degree and 0 otherwise. SCOT is defined as 1 for Scottish 
high school exams and 0 for English high school exams. Main controls include sex, marital status, age, high school GPA, parent 
SES, and industry fixed effects.  
 
  31Table 3: The Effect of Scottish Degree and Occupational Switching over Time 
dependent variable  growth in  log annual earnings    occupational mobility 
  (1) (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.034   0.039    -0.096*    -0.137**  SCOT 
[0.058]   [0.054]    [0.048]    [0.049] 
 0.065  0.066      0.065*  0.052  SWITCH   [0.036]  [0.037]      [0.031]  [0.032] 
   -0.016        0.108  SCOT*SWITCH 
   [0.074]        [0.065] 
              
Main controls  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Field of study effects  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Region of work effects  X  X  X    X  X  X 
              
R
2  0.19 0.19  0.19    0.08  0.08  0.08 
Observations 1,379  1,379  1,379    1,455  1,455  1,455 
Mean of dep. variable  0.69  0.69  0.69    0.24  0.24  0.24 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in brackets. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Sample 
includes all students who aimed to attain a first degree in England and Scotland with occupation data and were not pursing 
further studies. Dependent variable in columns (1), (2), and (3) is defined as growth in log annual earnings in the 6 years 
following completion of the undergraduate degree. Dependent variable in columns (4), (5), and (6) is defined as 1 if occupational 
field after 6 years is different from the occupational field after 1 year following completion of an undergraduate degree. SWITCH 
is defined as 1 if broad field of study is different from the broad occupational field in the 1st year following degree and 0 
otherwise. SCOT is defined as 1 for Scottish high school exams and 0 for English high school exams. Main controls include sex, 
marital status, age, high school GPA, parent SES, and industry fixed effects.  
 
  32Table 4: Effect of Scottish Degree on Occupational Switching for 1980 College Graduates 
dependent variable: switched to occupation unrelated to field of study 
 
1
st  year after completing degree     6
th year after completing degree  
  (1) (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.151** -0.086**  0.014   -0.174**  -0.110** -0.053  SCOT 
[0.035] [0.028]  [0.045]    [0.036] [0.029] [0.046] 
              
Main controls  X  X  X    X  X  X 
Field of study effects    X  X      X  X 
Region of work effects      X        X 
              
R
2  0.03 0.35  0.36    0.03  0.30  0.31 
Observations 1,455  1,455  1,455    1,455  1,455  1,455 
Mean of dep. variable  0.48  0.48  0.48    0.52  0.52  0.52 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors, clustered by university in brackets. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Sample includes all students who aimed to attain a first degree in England and Scotland with occupation data and 
were not pursing further studies. Dependent variable is defined as 1 if field of study at the undergraduate level is different from 
the broad occupational field of the first job in the 1st year following the degree and 0 otherwise. SCOT is defined as 1 for having 
completed Scottish school leaving exams and 0 for English school leaving exams. Main controls include sex, marital status, age, 
high school GPA, and parent SES.  
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Table 5: Subjective Assessments 
dependent variable: "How beneficial has your qualification been to you in…" 
  "Getting an Interesting Job"   "Becoming  an Educated Person" 
  (1) (2)    (3)  (4) 
-0.154 -0.202    0.041 0.044  SCOT  [0.126] [0.128]    [0.112]  [0.116] 
-0.265** -0.197*    0.312**  0.082  SWITCH  [0.075] [0.083]    [0.066]  [0.078] 
0.29 0.315    -0.534**  -0.536**  SCOT*SWITCH 
[0.189] [0.189]    [0.177]  [0.178] 
          
Main controls  X  X    X  X 
Field of study effects    X      X 
          
Observations 1,345  1,345    1,345  1,345 
Mean of dep. variable  3.24  3.24    2.83  2.83 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in brackets. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Sample 
includes all students who aimed to attain a first degree in England and Scotland with occupation data and were not pursing 
further studies. Results are from ordered probit regressions. Dependent variables are ordered categorical variables that take on 
values from 1 ("Not at all") to 4 ("A lot"). SWITCH is defined as 1 if broad field of study is different from the broad occupational 
field of first job in the 1st year following degree and 0 otherwise. SCOT is defined as 1 for Scottish high school exams and 0 for 
English high school exams. Main controls include sex, marital status, age, high school GPA, parent SES, industry fixed effects, 
log annual earnings in the first year and subjective measures of how beneficial the qualification has been to securing a good 
income.  
 Appendix Table 1: Classification of Fields and Occupations  
Fields  Subject codes (NSGD/USR-1980)  Occupational Codes (NSGD)  Occupational Codes (USR-1980) 
111 Math/Comp. Science      
  1111 Math Sciences  Mathematics (81)  Mathematician (444); Statistician (242)…  Operational research (441); Statistician (452) 
  1112 Computer Sciences  Computer Science (82); Math/Comp. Science (31)  Computer Programmer (244); Analyst/programmer (246)…  Systems analysis (442); Computer programming (443)… 
112 Physical Sciences      
  1121 Chemistry  Chemistry (34); Environmental Science (36)  Chemical scientist (442)  Scientist (510) + Chemical and allied industries (240-247) 
  1122 Geology  Geology (35)  Geological scientist (445)  Scientist (510) + Oil, mining industries (230-235) 
  1123 Physics  Physics (33); Mathematics/Physics (32)  Physical scientist (443)  Scientist (510) + Atomic energy (284); Other manufacturing 
121 Architecture       
   1210 Architecture  Architecture (51); Town plan (52); Surveying (17)   Architect (511); Town planning (514); Draughtsman (490)…  Architect (551); Town planning (553); Surveying (554)… 
122 Engineering       
  1221 Mechanical  Mechanical engineering (12)  Mechanical or aeronautical engineer (461)  Engineer (520) + Automotive industry (253) 
  1222 Chemical   Chemical Engineering (9)  Chemical engineer (481)  Engineer (520) + Chemical and allied industries (240-247) 
  1223 Civil   Civil Engineering (10)  Civil, municipal or structural engineer (451)…  Engineer (520) + Civil engineering contractors (220-225)… 
  1224 Electrical   Electrical Engineering (11)  Electrical engineer (471); Electronic engineer (472,473)  Engineer (520) + Electronic (256); Computers (257)… 
  1225 Industrial   Production engineering (13)  Production engineer (482); Planning engineer (483)…   Engineer (520) + Food (261); Drink (262); Textiles (271)… 
  1226 Materials  Mining (14); Metallurgy (15)  Mining engineer (452); Metallurgist (485)  Engineer (520) + Oil, mining industries (230-235) 
  1227 Aeronautical  Aeronautical engineer. (8)  Mechanical or aeronautical engineer (461)  Engineer (520) + Aircraft, aerospace industry (254) 
131 Life Sciences      
  1311 Agriculture  Agriculture (20); Forestry (23)…  Farmer, farm manager, horticulturist (600)  Scientist (510) + Agriculture, horticulture, forestry(210-214) 
  1312 Biology  Biology (25); Botany (26); Zoology (27)…  Biological scientist, biochemist (441)  Scientist (510) + Health authorities (154) 
132 Health Sciences      
  1321 Physicians  Medicine (3)  Medical practitioner (351)  Medicine (631); Medical & para-medical services (630) 
  1322 Dentists/Vets/Pharm  Dentistry (4); Veterinary (24); Pharmacology (5,6)  Dentist (352); Veterinarian (382); Pharmacist (371)…  Dentistry (632); Veterinary (640); Pharmacy (634)… 
  1323 Nursing/Related  Studies allied to medicine/health (7)  Nurse (360); Physiotherapist (374)…   Nursing (633); Physio-occupational, speech & therapy (636)  
211 Social Service      
  2111 Psychology  Psychology (46)  Psychologist (324)  Psychology (623); Occupational guidance (624) 
  2112 Sociology/Social Work  Sociology (47)  Sociologist (323); Welfare worker (333)...  Social, welfare, religious (620); Social/welfare (621)… 
212 Social Sciences      
  2121 Economics  Economics (41)  Economist (241)  Economic (450); Economist (451) 
  2122 History/ Geography  History (69); Archeology (70); Geography (42)  Librarian, information officer (294)  Librarian (721) Archivist (722) 
  2123 Govt., Public Admin.  Government and public administration (44)  Inspector (263); General administration (local govt) (280)…  Consumer protection, environmental health, safety (653)… 
  2124 Other Social  Social anthropology (48)  Social or behavioural scientist (325)  Non-scientific research (730); Information research (700)… 
221 Business      
  2211 Accounting, Finance  Accountancy (43)  Accountant (221); Investment analyst (228)…  Financial (460); Accountancy (461); Banking (462)… 
  2212 Management  Business, management studies (40, 53)  Management consultant (296); Manager (561)…  Management & supporting occupations (400)… 
  2213 Sales  Business, management studies (40, 53)  Advertising executive (252); Buying and selling (255)…  Purchasing (431); Selling (432); Marketing (434)… 
  2214 Related Business  Secretarial studies (84)  Office manager (572); Personal assistant (297)…  Clerical, secreterial & related (930)… 
222 Law      
  2220 Law  Law (45)  Judge (211); Advocate, barrister (212); Solicitor (213)…  Baristor (471); Solicitor (472); Trusts (473)… 
231 Education      
  2310 Education  Education (1)  Teacher (secondary) (311); Teacher (primary) (312)…  Primary (611); Middle school (612); Secondary (613)… 
232 Arts      
  2321 English/Languages  English (55); French (57); German (59)…  Author, writer, journalist, editor (391)  Journalist (811); Technical writer (711); Translater (712)… 
  2322 Art  Art (73)  Artist, commercial artist (401); Designer (402-406)   Art, sculpture, design (820); Fashion & textiles (823)… 
  2323 Performing arts  Drama (74); Music (75)  Actor, entertainer, musician, singer, stage manager (411)…  Acting, music, sport (830); Broadcasting/stage/film (840)… 
  2324 Religion/Philosophy  Religion (72); Philosophy (71)  Clergy, minister of religion (340)  Pastoral (622) 
 
Notes: Subject codes for USR are correct for 1972-1984 (different codes for 1985-1993) and occupational codes for the USR are correct from 1980-1993 (different codes for 1973-
1979). Occupational codes omit some categories for brevity and indicated with “…” when excluded. Engineers and scientist in the USR are matched with industry codes in order to 
identify particular specializations within each category. Further details are available from the author. Broad fields are in bold. Very broad fields are expressed by the 2-digit codes.
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.057 -0.070**  0.069  -0.086**  Baseline 
[0.034] [0.026]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
Classification of Fields      
-0.089* -0.067**  0.102*  -0.062  Narrow  [0.038] [0.021]  [0.042]  [0.034] 
-0.028 -0.071*  -0.023  -0.070*  Very Broad  [0.039] [0.029]  [0.042]  [0.028] 
Occupational Restrictions      
-0.057 -0.070**  0.069  -0.089**  Unemployed as Switch 
[0.034] [0.027]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
-0.054 -0.065**  0.026  -0.064*  Unclassified Occupations 
as Switch  [0.033] [0.022]  [0.044]  [0.026] 
-0.055 -0.069**  0.074  -0.088**  Include Graduate 
Students  [0.034] [0.026]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
-0.057 -0.070**  0.069  -0.086**  Graduate Students as 
Non-switch [0.034]  [0.026]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
Field Restrictions        
-0.062 -0.072**  0.079  -0.092** 
Exclude Education  [0.034] [0.027]  [0.050]  [0.029] 
-0.061 -0.071**  0.079  -0.089**  Education as Non-switch  [0.034] [0.027]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
-0.055 -0.080**  0.069  -0.079**  Exclude Business  [0.037] [0.027]  [0.050]  [0.030] 
-0.058 -0.080**  0.074  -0.074**  Business as Non-Switch 
[0.034] [0.027]  [0.049]  [0.028] 
-0.026 -0.078*  0.062  -0.107** 
Exclude Combined fields  [0.032] [0.032]  [0.051]  [0.028] 
Population restrictions        
-0.138** -0.071  0.089  -0.081  Restrict to highest GPA 
students  [0.050] [0.040]  [0.106]  [0.065] 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors in brackets. *, **, indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Coefficients on 
all wage regressions (columns 1-3) include main controls, controls for field of study, region of work, and industry. Coefficients 
on occupational switching sample (column 4) include main controls, controls for field of study, but no controls for region of 
work.  
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Figure 1: Expected Wages without Occupational Switching by  


























Figure 2: Expected Wages by Relative Return to Match Quality 
 
Notes: All simulations are based on 5000 repetitions for k=2, N=21, μ=0, σ0=25, and σ=100. Early regimes are 
characterized by n
E=2; late regimes are characterized by n
L=6.  The relative returns to match quality are normalized by 
taking β=(1-α) so that (α/β) goes from 0 to ∞ as α goes from 0 to 1. Expected wages are log wages determined 
according to E(ln wj)=E(αθi + βsi) where sj=[si/(N/k)]+μ are normalized skills. 
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Wages in 1981 Wages in 1986/87
England Scotland England Scotland
Non-Switch Switch
 
Notes: Mean log wages are predicted based on observable characteristics from the wage regressions of Table 2; 
specifically, columns (3) and (6). Log wages in 1986/87 are deflated to 1981 prices.  
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